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Abstract 
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I Introduction 
Studies of mutual funds have proliferated since the first evaluations of portfolio 
performance of U.S. mutual funds in the 1960s. Today, empirical evidence on fund 
performance can be found for most markets. On the whole, the evidence suggests that active 
fund managers fail to outperform a passive benchmark. More recent research includes the 
development of new performance measures and evaluations of the relation between fund 
characteristics and fund performance. Another important area of research focuses on fund 
manager behavior, and findings suggest that fund managers are momentum investors, i.e., 
they buy stocks with high past returns. However, in light of the fast-growing mutual fund 
industry of the 1990s, increasing attention has been given in the literature to the behavior of 
mutual fund investors. This paper extends current evidence by a detailed examination of 
Swedish households’ investment decisions in mutual funds and obtains results that differ 
somewhat from previous U.S. studies.  
Today, mutual funds have become a very popular investment vehicle and more than 
every second household in the U.S. owns a share in a mutual fund. In some countries, such as 
Sweden, mutual funds have attracted very broad investor groups and about 85% of 
households own a share in a mutual fund. Studies of mutual fund investors’ behavior are very 
important for several reasons. First, they can enrich the behavioral literature with empirical 
evidence from less sophisticated investors. Second, policymakers in many countries today are 
involved in reform plans for current pension systems. A common task is to strengthen the link 
between individuals’ payroll contributions and benefits, which often involves individuals 
having to invest in mutual funds. Hence, an understanding of investment behavior can have 
important implications for the design of pension systems. Finally, increased competition in 
the mutual fund industry is forcing asset managers to become more sophisticated in the battle 
for fund flows. Thus a crucial success factor for asset managers is a thorough understanding 
of the factors significantly affecting individuals when they choose to invest in mutual funds    2
Previous studies that have examined the relation between aggregate flows and fund 
characteristics have mainly evaluated past returns and fees; see for instance Ippolito (1992), 
Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998). Their findings 
suggest that, on average, investors chase past returns; in fact, the results even reveal a convex 
relation between past performance and fund inflows. That is, the best performing funds 
receive significantly more inflows than other funds. Further, other results indicate that the 
average investor prefers lower-fee funds. Another interesting study is Khorana and Servaes 
(2001), who show that both product differentiation and price competition are effective 
strategies in a fund family’s pursuit of market share. Specifically, they show that fund 
families charging higher fees have a lower market share, adjusted for investment objective. 
Sweden has recently launched a new public defined contribution pension system in 
which pension assets are invested in mutual funds chosen by the individual. The system is 
mandatory for the entire workforce, and this experimental situation provides a unique 
opportunity to deepen our knowledge of the determinants of fund flows since individuals’ 
preferences for certain fund characteristics are revealed when inflows to funds are examined.  
This paper extends current evidence of individuals’ preferred fund characteristics by 
thoroughly examining the fund inflows into the Swedish defined contribution pension system. 
Compared with previous studies, this study offers five main advantages. First, the Swedish 
data enrich the literature by providing empirical evidence from an unexplored market. More 
importantly, the data extends current evidence by an examination of less experienced 
investors compared with previous studies. Interestingly, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) 
document empirical differences in the flow-performance relation across mutual fund and 
pension fund industry segments that suggest that these managers operate in different 
environments. One potential explanation is that pension fund sponsors are often trained in the 
area of investment management and that they rely heavily on the recommendations of 
professional consultants when deciding managers to retain or hire. Hence, pension fund 
investors have a more sophisticated investment behavior than mutual fund investors. In the   3
light of this evidence, the Swedish data offers empirical evidence from less sophisticated 
investors than traditional mutual fund investors since it includes a significant share of 
investors that never before have invested in mutual funds. Second, the launch of the pension 
system was a “pure event” where  the flows can only be explained by fund characteristics. 
Other studies that examine flows using time-series data have problems separating asset 
allocation decisions from investors’ preferences for certain fund characteristics. Third, we 
examine both the relation between fund characteristics and capital inflows as well as the 
relation between fund characteristics and the number of investors the funds attract. This 
means that our results are not biased towards the biggest investors, which is the case in 
previous studies. Fourth, the data in this study are homogenous in that it consists of only 
individual investors who invested a similar amount of capital. Finally, prior to the investment 
decision, all individuals entitled to participate in the pension system received detailed 
information from the Premium Pension Authority (PPM) about all available investment 
opportunities (mutual funds). This information included past returns, fees, risk – measured as 
the standard deviation of returns – and detailed information on the fund companies. This 
enables us to extend the literature by examining new variables. 
Our results show that, to some extent, high past returns explain mutual fund flows. 
However, this paper finds that past returns are less important as a decision variable than 
previous studies suggest. Instead, direct and indirect costs are the most important explanatory 
variables of mutual fund flows. The results show a clear negative relation between 
management fees and inflows which highlights the importance of direct costs. To examine the 
indirect costs we use three proxies which show that individuals tend to invest in funds they 
are familiar with. For instance, the results show that individuals have a strong preference for 
domestic fund managers, that is, fund managers about whom they have a cumulative 
information advantage of. Moreover, funds without a track record (less available information) 
receive lower inflows than funds with a track record. Finally, individuals are likely to have a 
cumulative information advantage as regards the funds that belong to the bank they bank   4
with; the results show that individuals have a strong preference for funds that belong to one of 
the four main banks in Sweden. Overall, the above evidence suggests that familiarity breeds 
investments.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
reformed Swedish pension system and the Swedish mutual fund industry. In Section 3 we 
present the empirical hypotheses and some previous empirical evidence. Section 4 presents 
the evidence on the relation between fund characteristics and inflows. Finally, in Section 5, 
we offer our conclusions. 
 
II Data 
II.A The New Public Pension System 
An aging population forces policymakers in many countries to reform current pension 
systems. For many, one of the most important tasks is to create a pension system that is less 
sensitive to demographic changes. In 1999, Sweden introduced a reformed public and 
mandatory pension system consisting of two parts: a notional defined contribution pay-as-
you-go system (NDC PAYG) and an advance-funded defined contribution system (DC). This 
paper focuses on the latter system, which is also the smaller of the two parts. The pension 
system is based on a fixed contribution rate of 18.5% on earnings: 16% to the NDC PAYG 
system and 2.5% to the DC system. In the DC pension system, contributions are paid into an 
individual account once a year and are invested in the mutual funds of the individual’s choice. 
This implies that pension assets grow at the rate of return of the chosen funds.  
The government launched the new advance-funded defined contribution system in the 
fall of 2000 and consequently more than 4.4 million individuals were required to invest 
pension assets in mutual funds. At this time, accumulated contributions from 1995 to 1998 
amounted to approximately SEK 56 billion (one US dollar was equal to about 10 Swedish 
kronor), which was then distributed to the mutual funds in accordance with individuals’   5
investment decisions. The individuals in the system could choose to invest in one to five 
different mutual funds from 460 available funds. Hence, the Swedish system is substantially 
larger than the US 401(k) system, which typically only includes a few funds. For individuals 
that did not make an active investment decision, the government provided a publicly managed 
mutual fund (the default alternative).  
The premium pension system is run on a clearinghouse model, i.e., all investments and 
other transactions are collected at the Premium Pension Authority, which conducts the actual 
trading of the funds. This means that the fund managers are unaware of the identity and the 
number of individuals investing in their fund. Moreover, the system allows individuals to 
change funds free of charge. Engström and Westerberg (2003) provide a more detailed 
description of the new pension system. 
 
II.B Mutual Funds 
To help individuals make their investment decisions, a catalog containing detailed 
information on all available mutual funds was sent to everyone in the premium pension 
system. The catalog consisted of the 460 participating mutual funds; of these, 312 were 
classified as equity funds, 63 as fixed-income funds, and 85 as mixed or life-cycle funds. 
Information on the funds’ fees, past five-year returns, standard deviation of returns, and the 
fund family was included. Table 1 shows that 50% of all mutual funds were based in Sweden. 
About one third of the funds were new funds without a track record and 15% of the funds 
belonged to one of the four main banks in Sweden. The average fee was 1.11% for equity 
funds, 0.70% for mixed and life-cycle funds, and 0.60% for fixed-income funds. The standard 
deviation of returns was only reported for mutual funds that were at least three years old. For 
these funds, the average standard deviation was 25% for equity funds, 11% for mixed funds, 
and 4% for fixed-income funds. Table 1 also shows that the average return in 1999 was 58% 
for equity funds, 23% for mixed and life-cycle funds, and -3% for fixed-income funds.    6
The new publicly managed mixed fund, Premiesparfonden was set up to supervise 
contributions for individuals who did not make an active investment decision. The politically 
set target for this fund is to achieve an average return that will correspond at least to the 
average return of all other mutual funds in the system over a five-year period. This return 
must be accomplished at lower risk. Initially, 90% of the portfolio consisted of stocks, 25% of 
which were Swedish and 65% foreign, and the remaining 10% consisted of Swedish bonds. 
The fee for this fund is 0.48%, while the average fee for other mixed and life-cycle funds in 
the system is 0.71%. 
The new pension system will have a significant effect on the Swedish mutual fund 
industry. Before the new system was introduced, every second Swede owned a share in a 
mutual fund, but by 2001 85% of all Swedes held a share in a mutual fund. This implies that 
many individuals invested in mutual funds for the first time in association with the launch of 
the pension system. The system will also ensure high net flows of about SEK 20 billion in the 
coming years. Table 2 shows that the Swedish mutual fund industry grew and developed very 
fast during the second half of the 1990s. Total assets managed by this industry grew from 
SEK 207 billion at the beginning of 1995 to SEK 898 billion at the end of 2000. During this 
time, individuals also shifted their preferences from fixed-income funds to equity funds. 
Today, Swedes tend to have a stronger preference for equity funds than individuals in other 
countries; about 70% of the Swedish fund industry consists of equity funds. However, fixed-
income funds experienced high net flows in 1997 and 1998, mainly as a result of individuals 
shifting their money from direct holdings of bonds to fixed-income funds. 
The supply of different types of funds has also increased, but the Swedish industry is 
lagging behind that of the U.S. Traditionally, individuals in Sweden have mainly invested in 
funds with a country or a regional investment objective. However, during the late 1990s, 
passively managed funds, hedge funds and funds with an industry investment objective (e.g., 
technology and pharmaceuticals) received increasing attention. However, unlike in the U.S.,   7
passively managed funds in Sweden have not been very successful in attracting new money. 
Their share of net flows into the market has only been a few percent. 
 
III Hypotheses 
One important goal for individuals investing in mutual funds is to find a fund manager 
who will provide high future returns. Hence, these investors have to search for information on 
the available funds and judge whether the manager possesses a superior ability. Individuals 
have different experiences and backgrounds and therefore judge fund managers differently 
based on available information. The premium pension authority tried to facilitate the decision-
making process and the search for information by providing every individual in the system 
with a comprehensive catalog that contained information on all fund managers participating in 
the pension system. This section presents our hypotheses on how fund characteristics might 
affect individuals’ investment decisions. We also discuss previous empirical findings on this 
issue.  
 
III.A Past Returns 
When individuals search for fund managers who will outperform in the future an 
evaluation of past performance might naturally occur. Hence, past return is likely to be an 
important decision-variable for the investment decision since many individuals may believe 
that the funds will perform similarly in the future. Interestingly, some previous studies that 
have examined the relation between past performance and aggregate flow of capital into funds 
have documented this behavior. For example, Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that past 
performance is an important factor when individuals choose funds to invest in, and they show 
that flows in the U.S. fund market go to the best-performing funds. In line with this evidence, 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also find a positive relation between mutual fund inflows and 
risk-adjusted returns, but they also show that the relation is convex. Some studies have tried   8
to explain return-chasing behavior and examine whether it is profitable, while other studies 
attempt to explain the behavior from a psychological perspective. For example, Gilovich, 
Vallone, and Tversky (1985) show that people systematically underestimate the chance of 
observing streaks, such as a run of heads in the flip of an unbiased coin, in a random 
sequence. Thus, they are likely to conclude that the coin is biased if they observe streaks of 
heads or tails when an unbiased coin is flipped. Hence, individuals are likely to believe that a 
fund is superior if they observe abnormal high performance. Some supporting evidence exists 
for this strategy. Zheng (1999) for example, finds that funds that receive more money 
subsequently perform significantly better. This suggests that return-chasing behavior would 
be profitable, but the examination also shows that the effect is short-lived and to a large extent 
due to momentum. However, the strategy of investing in the best-performing funds receives 
some support in the literature on performance persistence, since the main results suggest that 
persistence in performance is mainly found in the worst performing funds; see, e.g., Hendriks, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996), and Carhart (1997). 
 
III.B Risk 
To date, only a few studies have examined individuals’ risk preferences when they invest 
in pension funds. One study, by Bernatzi and Thaler (2001), examines individuals’ investment 
behavior in a 401(k) pension plan. They evaluate individuals’ risk preferences by examining 
individuals’ investment in equity funds, mixed funds, and bond funds (high risk, medium risk, 
and low risk, respectively). Their results suggest that individuals divide their contributions 
evenly across available funds and that the proportion invested in equity funds is therefore 
related to the number of equity funds in the pension plan. Hence, risk preferences depend on 
the funds available in the system. This research extends previous evidence by considering a 
defined contribution system that includes many more funds than the U.S. 401(k) system. We 
deepen the understanding of individuals’ risk preferences by examining the relation between 
inflows and the funds’ past risk, measured as standard deviation.    9
 
III.C Fees 
Mutual fund fees received considerable attention in the Swedish media prior to the 
launch of the new pension system. The funds were often accused of charging unreasonably 
high fees, which would imply a lower future pension. Several studies support this argument 
since they have found a negative and statistical significant relation between performance and 
fees. For instance, Dahlquist, Engström, and Söderlind (2000) show that low-fee funds 
outperform high-fee funds in the Swedish market. This negative relation between the fee 
charged and the funds’ performance holds for both equity and money market mutual funds. In 
line with the Swedish evidence, Carhart (1997) finds a negative relation between fees and 
performance for U.S. mutual funds. This suggests that it is rational for investors to invest in 
low-fee funds. Moreover, Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that U.S. investors are rational in that 
they are fee-sensitive; they also show that lower-fee funds and funds that reduce their fees 
grow faster. 
 
III.D Information Costs 
Numerous academic studies have found that investors have different preferences for 
financial assets. Many results suggest that investors prefer assets they are familiar with. For 
instance, domestic investors tend to prefer domestic assets and do not hold as many foreign 
assets as standard portfolio theory would suggest. This is known as the home-bias puzzle (see 
Lewis (1999) for an overview). Coval and Moskowitz (1999) extend this evidence by 
documenting a home bias at home, i.e., investors prefers geographically close investments. 
Moreover, Kang and Stultz (1997) examine foreigners’ preferences in Japan and show that 
they prefer large firms with large export sales. This evidence is consistent with the conjecture 
that investors prefer to invest in assets that they are better informed about.   10
Interestingly, Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that this behavior is present in the mutual 
fund industry. Among other things, they show that a costly search for information affects 
mutual fund flows, and that in the U.S., funds receiving greater media attention and belonging 
to larger families grow more rapidly than other funds. Similarly, several studies of 
individuals’ investment decisions within pension plans highlight the importance of 
information costs and confirm the common hypothesis that familiarity breeds investments. 
For instance, Choi et al. (2002) examine the impact on savings behavior of several different 
401(k) features and show that individuals often accept the status quo, that is, they follow the 
path of least resistance. Other studies have found a positive relation between the amount of 
information that the individuals have to acquire and the likelihood of procrastination. 
Moreover, Engström and Westerberg (2003) show that individuals who possess more 
information and experience of financial markets are also more interested in making an active 
investment decision within the Swedish premium pension system.  
In line with the empirical evidence, Swedes have mainly invested in funds belonging to 
fund families they are familiar with. The supply of mutual funds in Sweden has traditionally 
consisted of funds managed by four main banks, and hence individuals invested in funds that 
belonged to the bank they were with. However, during recent years, many have started to be 
less loyal to “their” bank, and invest in funds offered by other companies. In this paper, we 
will employ three variables that can be considered as a measure of information costs and 
examine how they affect individuals’ investment decisions. The three variables are: 
i) New  fund.  This variable is a dummy for new funds, that is, the fund was 
established just prior to the launch of the new pension system. New funds have 
no track record and individuals are therefore less likely to be familiar with these 
funds. 
ii) Sweden-based  fund. This variable is a dummy for Sweden-based funds. We 
believe that individuals are more likely to be familiar with mutual funds based in   11
Sweden since a local presence implies more exposure to the public, and investors 
believe this provides them with an information advantage. 
iii) Bank.  This variable is a dummy for funds that are owned by the four main banks 
in Sweden. These banks have traditionally dominated the Swedish mutual fund 
industry and have controlled about 80% of assets under management. Hence, we 
believe that individuals are more familiar with the funds provided by these banks 
than with other available mutual funds. 
 
In contrast to the management fee, indirect or information costs are not found to be 
related to fund performance. Instead, some evidence suggests that the performance of foreign 
funds is similar to the performance of domestic Swedish funds. In fact, Engström (2001) 
shows that the performance of foreign-owned funds investing in Asia and Europe is similar to 
that of Swedish-owned funds. Hence, the main difference between foreign and Swedish-




IV.A A First Look 
This section presents a first look at the binary relation between fund inflows and various 
fund characteristics. The characteristics are past returns, risk (standard deviation of returns), 
fees, location of the fund, a dummy for new funds (i.e. funds without a track record), and a 
dummy for funds belonging to one of the four main banks in Sweden. We start by sorting 
funds by size of inflows and grouping mixed and fixed-income funds  into quintiles. Equity 
funds, however, are grouped into deciles, since there are many more equity funds than mixed 
and fixed-income funds.    12
Figure 1 shows how average inflow of capital varies between the deciles/quintiles. The 
average equity fund in the top decile received SEK 595 million whereas the average fund in 
the bottom decile received SEK 0.4 million. The corresponding figures for mixed and fixed-
income funds are SEK 410 million and SEK 51 million for the top quintiles, and SEK 1 
million and SEK 0.3 million for the bottom quintiles. Interestingly, we find a herding 
behavior among investors, that is, they flock into a few very popular funds. About 5% of the 
funds receive 50% of the total invested capital. Hence, large groups of individuals tend to 
have similar preferences for certain fund characteristics. An important challenge for fund 
managers, therefore, is to match these preferences because an ability to do so will be rewarded 
with a lion share of the inflows in the market.  
Figure 2 shows how the inflow of investors varies between the deciles/quintiles. We 
observe a similar pattern of investor flow and capital flow, which suggests that our evaluation 
of the relation between inflows and fund characteristics will not be biased towards the 
preferences of the biggest investors. In the following subsections, we will evaluate the binary 
relation between inflows and fund characteristics by grouping the funds into deciles/quintiles 
and calculating the average characteristics for each group. 
 
IV.A.1 Past  returns 
In this evaluation, we use six different horizons of return: each year separately from 1995 
to 1999 and total returns for the five-year period. This information is the same return data that 
PPM provided to all individuals before they made their pension investment decision. Table 3 
presents the average return for each decile and quintile for equity, mixed and fixed-income 
funds separately. By comparing these deciles and quintiles, we will see if a returns-chasing 
behavior exists among Swedes. In this evaluation, however, it is important to remember that 
the funds’ investment objective is a determinant of past returns, and especially for equity 
funds. European equity funds have significantly outperformed Asian equity funds, which 
mean that individuals investing in Asian funds will not be classified as return-chasing   13
investors even though they invest in the Asian fund associated with the highest past returns. 
Hence, it creates a very scattered picture of returns for equity funds and might explain why 
we do not observe a stronger relation between returns and inflow for equity funds. In Section 
IV.B, however, we evaluate the relation between inflows and fund characteristics in a 
multiple setting in which we control for a number of other variables such as the fund’s 
investment objective.  
In line with previous evidence, our grouping of equity funds into deciles based on inflow 
shows that individuals to some extent chase past returns. We find a strong relation between 
returns over the past five years and inflows, both in terms of capital and number of investors. 
The most recent annual return (year 1999) does influence investment decisions, but mainly in 
that the worst performing funds are avoided. Like the individuals investing in equity funds, 
individuals investing in fixed-income and mixed funds chase past returns to some extent. 
However, contrary to equity fund investors, Table 3 shows that fixed-income and mixed fund 
investors mainly chase the past one-year return. Interestingly, fixed-income investors avoid 
funds without a long return history. The bottom quintile for fixed-income funds consists only 
of funds with less than a three-year return history.  
Additional support for return-chasing behavior can be found when we evaluate inflows at 
a higher level, i.e., inflows into the different fund categories. Average returns for the equity 
funds are significantly higher than for mixed and life-cycle funds, which show significantly 
higher returns than fixed-income funds (see Table 3). This clear return pattern, in combination 




Individuals that made an active investment decision had to take risk into account in two 
instances. First, the choice of fund category, i.e., equity, fixed-income, or mixed funds, has a 
significant impact on the risk level of the portfolio. Equity funds are typically associated with   14
a higher risk level than fixed-income funds and mixed funds, which are associated with a low 
and intermediate risk level, respectively. The second choice concerned the preferred risk level 
of the funds in the chosen category. Individuals made this decision based on the standard 
deviation of returns for funds that was reported in the catalog. This section presents some 
empirical evidence on both individuals’ preferences for risky funds and fund categories by 
using standard deviation as a risk measure. One drawback of this evaluation is that standard 
deviation is only available for funds that had existed for more than three years (about 40% of 
available funds). 
About 68% of all available funds were equity funds, and these received 72% of the 
inflows. Mixed and life-cycle funds received inflows that correspond to the number of 
available funds: they represented 18% of the number of funds and received 26% of the 
inflows. Fixed-income funds were not as popular as the other funds; they received only 2% of 
the inflows even though they account for 14% of available funds. Overall, this is a high-risk 
profile and even higher than the risky default alternative which includes 10% fixed-income 
securities. This result suggests a strong preference for risk and especially among those who 
made an active investment decision. 
When we examine individuals’ preferences for the funds’ past risk level, we find mixed 
evidence for the separate fund categories. Figure 3 shows the relation between the funds’ risk 
level and capital inflow into the funds. We can see that there is no significant relation between 
risk (measured as standard deviation of returns) and inflow for equity funds. However, the top 
decile in terms of inflow for equity funds is associated with the lowest average risk. Hence, 
individuals appear to prefer less risky equity funds. Similarly, we find a negative, but also 
statistically significant relation, between inflow and risk for fixed-income funds. In a broader 
context, this result is somewhat surprising, since individuals who invest in the fixed-income 
fund category choose a low-risk strategy. Hence, fixed-income fund investors are very risk 
averse. Unlike investors in equity and fixed-income funds, investors in mixed funds,   15
especially those with a smaller amount to invest, prefer funds associated with a higher risk 
level.  
 
IV.A.3 Management  fee 
Similar to Sirri and Tufano’s study of U.S. investors, we find a clear negative relation 
between the fee charged and inflow of capital in the Swedish pension system. Figure 4 shows 
that the average equity fund in the top decile of inflows charges a fee of 0.83% whereas the 
average fund amongst those receiving the lowest inflows charges a fee of 1.40%. A similar 
pattern is observed for mixed funds; funds in the top quintile of inflows charge, on average, a 
fee of 0.50% and those in the lowest quintile charge 0.97%. A low fee is also a distinguishing 
characteristic of fixed-income funds that received the highest inflows of capital. The average 
fee for the top quintile is 0.39% whereas the average fee for the lowest quintile is 0.84%. 
However, Figure 4 shows that the relation between fees and inflows for fixed-income funds is 
not as clear as for equity and mixed funds, since the average fund in the third quintile charges 
a relatively high fee of about 0.73%. 
 
IV.A.4  Fund Location  
The results show that individuals have a very strong preference for domestic funds. The 
top quintile, in terms of inflow of capital and investors for both fixed-income and mixed 
funds, consists entirely of Sweden-based funds. In addition, 100% of the lowest quintile for 
fixed-income funds is foreign-based funds. Figure 5 also shows a strong preference for 
domestic equity funds. More than 90% of the top quintile consists of Sweden-based funds. 
These results suggest that individuals prefer mutual funds that they have more information 
about. Hence, funds associated with lower information costs attract more investors. 
   16
IV.A.5 New  Fund 
Overall, Figure 6 presents weak evidence suggesting that individuals have somewhat 
stronger preferences for funds with a track record than for new funds. We see that new mixed 
funds without a track record are less attractive. Only 29% of the funds in the top quintile of 
inflows are new, whereas in the fourth quintile 78% are new. We find a less clear pattern for 
equity and fixed-income funds but the figure shows a significant difference between the top 
and bottom deciles for equity funds: 53% of funds in the bottom decile are new funds, 
whereas the corresponding figure for the top decile is 31%. Hence, compared with fund 
location, our dummy for new funds seems to be a less important decision variable. Though 
the results are weaker, they go in the same direction; less information or higher information 
costs imply lower inflows. 
 
IV.A.6 Bank 
Funds that belong to one of the four main banks in Sweden received, on average, higher 
inflows than other funds; 38% of equity funds in the top decile of inflows belong to one of the 
banks, whereas only 3% of funds in the lowest decile of inflows belong to these distributors. 
A similar positive relation is observed for mixed funds (see Figure 7); however, the graph 
peaks at the fourth quintile, where 72% of funds belong to one of the four banks, whereas this 
is so only for 24% of funds in the top quintile. In contrast, only 6% of funds in the lowest 
quintile belong to one of the banks. Figure 7 also shows that funds provided by these banks 
were more popular than other funds. About 15% of the two top quintiles belong to these 
distributors. Hence, similar to fund location, our bank dummy seems to be a good proxy for 
information costs, and the results suggest that individual investors choose funds associated 
with lower information costs. In other words, they invest in the funds belonging to “their” 
bank. 
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IV.B Regression Analysis 
In this section, we evaluate the statistical relation between fund characteristics and fund 
inflows. The single regressions between a fund characteristic and inflow give results that 
resemble those in the previous section. Therefore, this analysis will focus on a multiple 
evaluation of the determinants of fund inflows.  
We evaluate the statistical relation between inflows and fund characteristics by running 
OLS regressions and employing the following model: 
 
i j ij j ij x x F F ε γ γ + − × + = − ) ( 1 0 ,       (1) 
 
where  ij F  represents inflows of fund i that belong to funds with the investment objective j 
and ij x  is a vector of fund characteristics for the same fund.  0 γ  and  i ε  are the intercept and 
error term in the regression, respectively. Hence, one important feature of this model is that 
we control for the funds’ investment objectives, which is essential for equity funds since this 
is the most important determinant of past returns. Thus, in contrast to the previous section, our 
empirical results will not give any information about whether investors are flocking into the 
funds associated with the highest returns. Instead, our regressions will shed light on whether 
investors, for instance, prefer funds with high past returns relative to other funds with similar 
characteristics. Table 4 reports the constant 1 γ , which provides information on the relation 
between inflows and fund characteristics. Furthermore, we evaluate both inflows of capital 
and number of investors for equity funds, mixed funds, and fixed income funds separately. 
Generally, there is a low correlation between all fund characteristics in our data except 
the correlation between return and risk. Funds that show high past returns are typically 
associated with a high level of risk. This, of course, has implications for the specification of a 
multiple regression model. In order to avoid multicollinearity, we have chosen not to include 
risk in the model, as risk is highly correlated with returns. There were two reasons for this   18
decision. First, we have evaluated several models that include the risk variable, but our 
findings are consistent with those in the previous section: no significant relation is found 
between the risk level of the fund and inflows. Second, we have access to fewer observations 
for the risk variable (only funds that have existed for a longer period than three years) than for 
returns. Hence, we include past returns in the multiple regression model instead of risk level. 
The other explanatory variables in the model are: fees, a dummy for Sweden-based funds, a 
dummy for new funds without a track record, and a dummy for funds belonging to the four 
main banks in Sweden. We have access to a high-quality dataset and there are no missing 
values for the fund characteristics except for past returns. A multiple regression (when  ij x  is a 
vector) typically throws away all lines of data where there is a missing value in one of the 
regressors. This is a waste of information. To get around this problem, we use the two-step 
approach in Griliches (1986), which essentially amounts to estimating each regression 
coefficient using all available data for that particular regressor.
1 Another advantage of this 
approach is that it allows us to include both past returns and the dummy for new funds in the 
same regression. 
 
IV.B.1 Past returns 
Table 4 shows a somewhat mixed result on the relation between fund inflows and past 
returns. We find a weak but positive relation between inflows and returns when we evaluate 
all funds in a joint estimation. The coefficient is significant at the 10% level, and a fund 
associated with 10% higher returns than other funds receives only SEK 4.7 million more in 
                                                 
1 The approach in Griliches (1986) allows for missing values (see also Greene (1997) chapter 9). In the 
regression equation  i i bz i ax i y ε + + = , we have data on  i x  for  1 N i ∈ , but we have data on  i y  and 
i z  for  2 1 N N i ∪ ∈  (the whole sample). First, estimate the regression on  1 N i ∈  and let 
1 ˆN a  denote 
the estimate of a. Second, run the regression  i u i z i x + = δ  on  1 N i ∈ , and let  i i z x δ = ˆ  for  2 N i ∈  
and  i x i x ˆ =  for  1 N i ∈ . Third, run the regression  i v i bz i x N a i y + = − ˆ
1
ˆ   2 1 N N i ∪ ∈ . The estimate 
of b from the third step, and 
1 ˆN a  from the first step, are taken to be the estimates.   19
capital inflows and attracts only 1,100 more investors. Naturally, the result for equity funds is 
similar to the result for all funds, since 68% of all funds are equity funds. Hence, we also find 
a weak positive relation between inflows and returns, but it is the least significant determinant 
of inflows. It is significant at the 10% level for capital inflows capital but not statistically 
significant for number of investors. For mixed funds, we find a somewhat stronger relation 
between inflows and past returns. A mixed fund associated with a 10% higher return than 
other funds receives SEK 44.5 million more in capital inflows and attracts 5,400 more 
investors. In contrast, the results show no relation between capital inflows or number of 
investors and past returns for fixed-income funds. 
Overall, these results suggest that past returns is a less important determinant of inflows 
to funds than previous studies of fund flows in the U.S. mutual fund industry have found. 
However, it is important to remember that the weak flow-return relation appears when we 
control for a number of other fund characteristics that seem to have some impact on the 
individuals’ investment decisions. Additionally, we also control for the funds’ investment 
objectives, which are important determinants of past returns. 
 
IV.B.2 Management fees 
Similar to our binary evaluation of fund flows and management fees, we find a strong 
relation between fees and inflows when we evaluate all funds jointly in a multiple setting. A 
one percent lower fee implies significantly higher inflows: about SEK 122 million, and 26 
000 more investors. Consistent with the results of all the funds, Table 4 shows a strong 
negative relation between inflows and fees for equity funds. However, compared with all 
funds, a lower fee attracts significantly more investors but they invest less per capita. A one 
percent lower fee implies that the fund attracts 108,000 more investors and SEK 27 million 
more in capital. The difference between equity funds and the all funds category can be 
explained by individuals investing in mixed or life-cycle funds. Similarly, the empirical 
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evidence shows a clear negative relation between inflows and management fees for mixed 
funds. However, a lower fee has a very strong impact on capital inflow. A one percent lower 
fee results in SEK 253 million more in inflows and 36,000 more investors. Finally, we also 
find a clear negative flow-fee relation for fixed-income funds. 
These results confirm previous evidence suggesting that the management fee is an 
important determinant of fund flows. However, these results not only confirm previous 
findings but indicate that the disclosed fee is the most important decision variable when 
individuals invest in mutual funds. One important implication is that high past returns do not 
easily offset the negative impact of a high fee.  
  
IV.B.3 Information costs 
The results in Table 4 suggest that a strong relation exists between the location of the 
fund and inflows when we evaluate equity funds and all funds. Our joint estimation for all the 
funds indicates that Sweden-based funds receive about SEK 84 million and 23,000 more 
investors than funds that are based abroad. Corresponding figures for equity funds are inflows 
of SEK 22 million and 66,000 investors. A somewhat weaker result, that is statistically 
significant at the 10% level, is found for fixed-income funds. This result also suggests that 
Sweden-based funds receive higher inflows: about SEK 25 million and 7,000 more investors. 
In contrast, inflows to mixed funds cannot be explained by the location of the fund. However, 
there is one important difference between the different fund types: the mixed funds are more 
homogenous than the equity and fixed-income funds in that they mainly consist of Sweden-
based funds (74% of the mixed funds are Sweden-based). This fact can explain the different 
result.  
Similar to the strong results for our location dummy, we find a clear pattern when 
evaluating the impact that our new dummy has on fund inflows. These results show that 
individuals tend to avoid investing in funds without a track record. For all the funds, our 
estimates from the multiple regressions suggest that new funds without a track record receive   21
SEK 77 million less capital and attract 19,000 fewer investors. The corresponding figures for 
equity funds are SEK 17 million less capital and 54,000 fewer investors for funds with no 
track record. It is also important for mixed and life-cycle funds to present a track record in 
order to attract investors but, in contrast to equity funds, our new dummy has a stronger 
impact on capital inflows than on number of investors. A mixed fund that does not disclose a 
track record receives, according to our estimates, SEK 201 million less capital and 32,000 
fewer investors. In the fixed-income fund group, we have the lowest share of funds without a 
track record: only 23%. However, for this group of funds we do not find a statistical 
significant relation between the new dummy and inflows. 
Our bank dummy is the final characteristic that is related to information costs. For this 
variable we find somewhat weaker results. However, we find a statistically significant relation 
between the bank dummy and inflows when we evaluate all the funds in a joint estimation, 
and when we evaluate equity funds separately. The results for all the funds suggest that it is a 
clear advantage for funds to belong to one of the four main banks. On average they should 
receive SEK 78 million and 23,000 more in inflows of capital and investors, respectively. 
However, the results for equity funds suggest, as usual, that our proxy for information costs 
has a stronger impact on inflows of investors than on inflows of capital. The estimated 
coefficients for our bank dummy indicate that equity funds belonging to one of the main 
banks should receive SEK 38 million more in capital and attract 135,000 more investors. In 
contrast, our results for mixed and life-cycle funds and fixed-income funds show that the 
coefficient for our bank dummy is not statistically significant. 
Overall, the above evidence clearly suggests that information costs have a significant 
impact on investment decisions. All three proxies for information costs show that funds 
associated with lower costs receive higher inflows of capital and investors. Hence, familiarity 
breeds investment, which is in line with the behavioral literature, and the resulting behavior 
may be rational since no evidence exists to suggest that these funds are associated with lower 




This paper examines the investors’ preferred fund characteristics in the new defined 
contribution pension system in Sweden. Overall, we show that individual investors appear to 
have similar preferences and are flocking into just a few funds: about 5% of the funds receive 
50% of invested capital. The individuals in the system seem to have an appetite for risk, since 
the inflows of capital are biased towards equity funds. They receive 72% of invested capital, 
although the share of equity funds in the system is 68%. However, our results indicate that 
individuals seem to be reluctant to invest in the riskiest equity funds, in terms of standard 
deviation of returns.  
Previous U.S. studies of determinants of mutual fund flows typically suggest that 
investors chase past returns, and also that a convex relation exists between past returns and 
fund inflows. In our evaluation of 4.4 million Swedish individuals’ preferences for certain 
fund characteristics, we find some evidence to support the U.S. findings. For instance, 
individuals have a strong preference for equity funds, which obviously showed high past 
return figures (based on the late 1990s). Moreover, our binary evaluation shows a strong and 
positive relation between past returns and fund inflows. However, we find evidence 
suggesting something slightly different when we include fund characteristics related to 
information costs and evaluate the relation between fund characteristics and inflows in a 
multiple setting where we control for the funds investment objectives. In this analysis, we 
include dummy variables for funds the individuals are likely to possess more information on 
and therefore be more familiar with. All variables in the multiple analysis have low 
correlation. The dummies are i) funds with versus without past track record; ii) Sweden-based 
funds versus foreign-based funds, and iii) funds belonging to one of the four main banks in 
Sweden versus other funds. Interestingly, our results suggest that past returns are less 
important as a determinant of mutual fund flows than suggested by U.S. evidence. Instead,   23
investors seem to have a strong preference for funds they are familiar with. Funds with a past 
track record that are based in Sweden and belong to one of the four main banks attract 
significantly more investors and receive higher inflows of capital. However, in line with 
previous evidence, we also find a significant relation between management fees and fund 
inflows. Low-fee funds attract broad investor groups and receive significantly larger capital 
inflows than high-fee funds. 
Our findings on the investment behavior of the individuals in the reformed pension 
system are very much in line with what the psychology literature on the whole puts forward. 
We find that individuals behave more rationally than previously suggested. Both indirect and 
direct costs associated with the funds have a significant impact on investment choice. This 
behavior has support in the literature. For instance, previous studies have found a negative 
relation between management fees and fund performance. This suggests that individual 
investors behave rationally since they prefer low-fee funds. Moreover, another important 
determinant of fund inflows is information costs. In the Merton (1987) model, rational 
investors prefer assets they are better informed about. Hence, individuals minimize the 
indirect transaction costs involved in gathering and evaluating information on the funds by 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Mutual Funds in the Premium Pension System  
Category No.  Based  in 
Sweden 
New Fee  Bank  Risk  Return 






















































































































































































































          
The table shows mutual fund characteristics in the public defined contributions system in Sweden. No. 
refers to the total number of funds. Based in Sweden refers to the proportion of mutual funds that are 
based in Sweden (based in Sweden=1, other=0). New refer to if the fund was new (new=1, old=0). Fee 
is the management fee in %. Bank refers to if the fund belongs to one of the main banks in Sweden 
(main bank=1, other=0), and Risk is the funds monthly standard deviation of returns in %. Return 
refers to past year return (1999). For each characteristic, we first report average value, then median 
value in parenthesis, and finally, standard deviation of value. The default fund, premiesparfonden, is 
not included.  
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 Table 2. Size and Flows of the Swedish Mutual Fund Industry 
   1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Equity  No.  294 286 300 330 356 394 453 
  TNA  132,415 151,769 202,270 307,143 365,409 591,703 595,461 
  Flow -4,292 1,339  2,115  52,564 14,108 27,143 68,732 
           
Mixed  No.  29 30 37 40 46 62 100 
  TNA 22,629 25,686 38,703 66,098 91,222 147,173  179,482 
  Flow 10,766 521  5,727  18,001 12,433 4,578  24,637 
           
Fixed-  No.  98  113 114 115 124 135 132 
Income  TNA 52,042 64,908 78,059 82,674 104,294  115,746  123,451 
  Flow  977 6,600  7,567  370 16,024  -255  5,096 
           
All  No.  421 429 451 485 526 591 685 
  TNA  207,086 242,364 319,032 455,915 560,925 854,621 898,394 
  Flow 7,452  8,459  15,409 70,935 42,565 31,466 98,465 
           
The table shows the number of funds, size, and flows in the Swedish mutual fund industry for the 
period 1994 to 2000. No. and TNA refer to the total number of funds and the total net assets in SEK 
millions (as at December 31 each year). Flow refers to the annual net flows into the fund categories. 
All refers to all funds (i.e., all funds in the Equity, Mixed, and Fixed-income category). Fixed-income 
includes both money market funds and bond funds.  
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Table 3. Aggregate Flows and Past Returns 




1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  5  Years 
           
Equity                   
10  15 (16) 30 (29) 35 (36) 37 (39) 57 (56) 326 (325) 
9  16 (16) 37 (36) 29 (25) 14 (11) 79 (83) 282 (283) 
8  10  (7)  35 (29) 23 (17) 15 (10) 58 (62) 236 (196) 
7  -2 (-2) 11 (17)  8  (18) 10 (12) 82 (74) 116 (147) 
6  -1  (1)  32 (33) 23 (25)  5  (2)  63 (58) 173 (162) 
5  0  (-4) 25 (18) 33 (24) -1 (-2) 57 (67) 110 (88) 
4  -5 (-1) 22 (31) 17 (22)  9  (12) 62 (55) 115 (145) 
3  11 (11) 17 (17) 35 (35) 18 (16) 31 (31) 146 (146) 
2  -9 (-10) 14 (10) 13  (4)  7  (5)  39 (41)  55  (12) 
1  -5 (-5) 21 (21) 27 (27) 19 (19) 40 (40) 163 (163) 
                
Mixed                
5  14 (14) 25 (25) 20 (20) 16 (16) 45 (45) 178 (178) 
4  14 (14) 23 (23) 20 (19) 17 (17) 33 (35) 162 (153) 
3  8  (8)  19 (19) 14 (14) 15 (15) 18 (18) 123 (123) 
2  6  (6)  15 (14) 18 (19) 20 (21) 13  (8)  75  (69) 
1  6  (6)  14 (14) 19 (19) 20 (20)  4  (4)  82  (82) 
Fixed-                
Income                
5  14  (14)  13  (13)  5 (5) 9 (9) 0 (0) 49 (49) 
4  8 (8)  10  (10)  9 (9) 8 (8) 2 (2) 44 (44) 
3  9  (10) 11 (11) 16 (13) 12 (11) -2 (-1)  56  (56) 
2  6 (6) 6 (6) 6 (6)  13  (13)  -6  (-6) 26 (26) 
1  N/A (N/A) N/A (N/A) N/A (N/A)  18  (18)  -11  (-11)  N/A  (N/A) 
                    
The table shows the relation between net inflows and past returns for equity funds, fixed-income funds, 
and mixed funds. Equity funds are divided into deciles, based on net inflows, and average past return 
for the single years of 1995 to 1999 and for the whole period of 1995 to 1999 are calculated for each 
decile. Average past return is calculated based on both net inflows of capital and number of investors 
(in parentheses). The results are presented in descending order, where the top decile refers to the funds 
that received the largest inflows. Corresponding averages are calculated for fixed-income and mixed 
funds, while, the averages are calculated for quintiles.   29
Table 4. Regression Analysis of Aggregate Flows 
Category     Return  Fee  Based  New  Bank 
           
All Capital Coeff. 0.47  -121.95 83.91 -77.23  77.92 
  Std  0.25  29.35 25.56 20.20 28.31 
 Investors Coeff. 0.11  -25.72 23.08 -18.86  22.66 
  Std  0.06  7.17 6.25 4.94 6.92 
         
Equity Capital Coeff. 0.15  -26.74 21.69  -17.10 37.99 
  Std 0.09 9.47 8.64  7.01  10.49 
 Investors Coeff. 0.52  -108.16 65.56  -54.19 135.34 
  Std  0.34  37.03 34.03 28.11 42.06 
         
Mixed Capital Coeff.  4.45 -253.05 -16.94  -200.71  42.47 
  Std  1.92  62.42 74.13 39.56 43.15 
 Investors Coeff. 0.54  -35.79 5.25  -31.66  7.16 
  Std  0.29  9.42 11.20 5.98 6.52 
         
Fixed- Capital Coeff.  0.03 -25.76 24.51 6.43 0.80 
Income  Std 0.45  13.57 14.63  7.10  13.24 
 Investors Coeff.  0.01  -7.32 7.11 1.75 0.77 
  Std  0.12  3.88 4.18 2.02 3.78 
          
The table shows the results from the multiple regressions of inflows of capital and investors on fund 
attributes. Coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level are emphasized and associated standard 
errors are reported. Capital refers to SEK million and Investors to thousands of individuals. Return 
refers to the one-year past return. Fee refers to management fee. Based is a dummy, where 1 refers to 
Swedish based funds and 0 refers to foreign based funds. New is a dummy, where 1 refers to funds that 
has recently been established and lack historical data. Bank is a dummy, where 1 refers to funds that 
belong to one of the four main banks.  
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The figure shows the average inflow of capital to funds. Averages are computed for each decile, based 




































The figure shows the average inflow of individuals to funds. Averages are computed for each decile, 
based on inflow of individuals, for equity funds and each quintile for mixed and fixed-income funds.   31
















































The figure shows the average standard deviation of returns for the sample of funds. Averages are 




































The figure shows the average management fee for the sample of funds. Averages are computed for 
each decile, based on inflow of capital, for equity funds and each quintile for mixed and fixed-income 
funds.   32








































The figure shows the relation between inflows of capital and the location of the fund. The fraction of 
funds that are based in Sweden are computed for each decile, based on inflow of capital, for equity 


































The figure shows the impact that an available track record has on inflows of capital to funds. The 
fraction of funds that have a historical track record are computed for each decile, based on inflow of 
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The figure shows how inflow of capital varies for funds that belong to well known fund companies. 
The fraction of funds that belong to a well known fund company (four banks) are computed for each 












                                                 
 